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LEIBNIZ'S EXAMINATION OF
THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION
Robert Merrihew Adams

Leibniz, though a lifelong member of the Lutheran church, left us a complete,
Roman Catholic systematic theology. The present paper explores the questions this raises for our understanding of his life and religious thought, placing him in the context of the Calixtine Lutheran theology dominant in Lower
Saxony in his time. The work is shown to be neither a platform for church
reunion nor Leibniz's personal confession of faith, but it does reflect his own
views regarding a theology of love and the practical nature of theology.

It is not widely known that Leibniz wrote a complete treatise of systematic
theology. A hundred short pages of Latin text, in the edition 1 shall cite, 1 it
has been generally known by the title Theological System [Systema
theologicum]; but the back of the last page bears the inscription Examination
of the Christian Religion, arguably in Leibniz's own hand (B 4),2 and I shall
use that title. Numerous affinities with other writings indicate that it was
probably composed in the mid-1680's, and thus belongs to the period in which
Leibniz's thought assumed its mature form. The paper on which it is written
has the same watermark as paper that Leibniz is known to have used during
the first four months of 1686, when the Discourse on Metaphysics was written
(VE 2411).
The nineteenth century saw the first publication of the Examination, and
several subsequent Latin editions, as well as translations into French, German, and English. 3 The twentieth century has paid little attention to it, no
doubt in part because many of our century's Leibniz scholars have not been
much interested in questions of Christian theology, but also because it is
genuinely hard to know what to make of the book.4 Though written by one
who remained a member of the Lutheran church throughout his life, it is
unmistakably a work of Roman Catholic rather than Protestant theology. It
thus confronts us with the difficult issue of Leibniz's personal religious
stance.
It is well known that he was a pioneer in what is now known as ecumenism,
and engaged for many years in theological discussions aimed at the reunion
of the churches. He was interested in all the theological tendencies of Western Europe in his time, and well informed about them. In many of his
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writings in ecumenical theology his voice is that of an impartial arbiter,
clarifying the positions and censuring the arguments on each side, and trying
to find points of contact between them.s This is not Leibniz's only theological
voice, however. Sometimes his voice is that of a loyal Protestant (e.g., A
VI,i,S16), and occasionally that voice speaks of Catholic positions with a
certain asperity (Gr 206f. from 1697) or even sarcasm (VE 266-72/L 213-16).
Another voice, with greater pathos than the others, is heard from the late
1660's through the mid-1680's, the voice of one who would like personally
to join the Roman Catholic Church but feels unable in conscience to do so.
There is also the voice of a Catholic, a voice heard as early as in the "Catholic
Demonstrations" of the late 1660's (e.g., A VI,i,S08-13/L l1S-19). This is
the voice that is heard in the Examination.
Which of these voices is Leibniz's own? All of them are, at least in the
sense that distinctively Leibnizian things are said in all of them. This adds
to the difficulty of knowing how much Leibniz believed of what he said in
the different voices, particularly the Catholic voice. Closely related is the
difficulty of understanding his motives in speaking thus. I cannot claim to
be able to resolve these difficulties entirely, even with regard to the Examination, let alone the whole array of Leibniz's theological writings. But I
think I discern in his work a coherent theological stance that makes sense of
most of the phenomena and motivates most of the writings.
Leibniz's religious thought certainly changed with the years, especially in
its flavor and emphasis. After some point in the later 1680's it is obviously
less favorable to Roman Catholicism, and seems to me also to manifest less
religious fervor; those who will may speculate about connections between
those changes. One may also speculate on the extent to which Leibniz,
political on principle in these matters (as we shall see), was motivated in his
changing attitudes by changes in his political context. The attention of the
Hannoverian court, still focused in the early 1690's on the Electoral rank it
was obtaining, and hence on the Catholic court in Vienna, had turned by 1700
toward its hopes for succession to the British throne, and hence toward the
Protestant politics of London. And in a more general way, Protestantism
probably appeared more firmly established in northern Europe in Leibniz's
last years than it did in his youth. Nonetheless I believe the theological
position that underlies the Theodicy of l710 is still basically the same as that
which motivated the Examination a quarter century earlier.

1. The Hannover Strategy for Church Reunion
In a letter of 14/24 March 1683 to his most intimate Catholic correspondent
of that period, Count Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels, Leibniz wrote that
I believe one could compose an Exposition of all the controversial articles
that ... ought to satisfy even the most precise people; the more so, the more
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they are fit to examine the matters in depth, provided these same people are
well intentioned. If such an exposition were as well done as I conceive is
feasible, good God, what fruit wouldn't it bear in the Church? I even believe,
if it were done by a man who dissembled his name and his party, that it could
get separately the approval or avowal of tolerability of the ablest and best
intentioned Theologians of each party independently, without either group
knowing anything about the others. (A I,iii,279f.)

The idea of obtaining approval for an anonymous or pseudonymous work on
points of controversy recurs a year later, in a letter of March 1684 to Count
Ernst, with Leibniz's explicit desire to write it himself, and with a more
Catholic audience apparently in mind, for Leibniz states that "it must not be
known in any way that the author is not in the Roman Communion. That
prejudice alone renders the best things suspect" (A I,iv,325; cf. A I,iv,329).
The Examination has been regarded as fulfilling or growing out of this desire;
and as the letter of 1683 clearly envisages an exposition that would serve as
a theological platform for reunion of the churches, the Examination too has
been viewed as intended for that role. 6
This can hardly have been Leibniz's intention, however; for he must have
recognized that the book is much too one-sidedly Catholic to be suited for
that role. In fact it can be shown that there is no direct role for the Examination in the strategy for reunion of the churches that Leibniz regarded as
most promising in the mid-1680's and pursued in his correspondence with
Bossuet in the 1690's. Even as Leibniz wrote to Count Ernst in March of
1683, the main lines of this strategy were being laid down in secret negotiations in Hannover about which Leibniz was not then free to say much to the
Count (A I,iii,280,288). Later, in November 1687, Leibniz felt able to write
a memorandum for the Count in which it is fully described and presented
with enthusiasm as "of all the methods that have been proposed to remove
this great Schism of the West, ... the most reasonable" (A I,v,lO). We can
hardly discern the motives of the Examination without understanding this
strategy and the very specific political, ecclesiastical, and theological context
in which Leibniz's ecumenical efforts took place.
The strategy had initially a German focus (A I,v,15), and received its first
impetus from the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I (a Catholic), who sent the
Catholic bishop Cristobal de Rojas y Spinola7 to negotiate with the Protestant
princes of Germany regarding reunion of the churches. Rojas claimed to have
obtained declarations of approval from a number of Catholic theologians for
a package of conciliatory proposals in which he sought to interest the Protestants. His main proposal, as Leibniz saw it, was that Protestants could be
allowed to join the Roman Catholic Church, and their clergy could be ordained as priests and bishops in it, without first settling all the disputed issues.
This proposal could be approved on the basis of "the Great Principle of the
Catholics, which is that a Christian is in the internal communion of the
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Church, and is neither heretic nor schismatic, when he is in the Spirit of
submission, ready to receive and desirous of learning what God reveals," not
only in the Scriptures but also through the tradition of the Church and particularly a legitimate Ecumenical Council of the Church. Mere doctrinal
error, without rebelliousness, does not make one a heretic. Moreover, this
line of thought continues, those who, by an error of fact, doubt the legitimacy
of a particular Ecumeni-cal Council, "and believe themselves grounded in
good reasons, and are so persuaded of it that their error is morally invincible
in the present state of things, are not heretics, provided that they recognize
[in principle] sincerely and in good faith the power of the Councils of the
Catholic Church." Since Protestants could be judged by Catholics to be in
this condition with regard to the Council of Trent (and since, as Leibniz notes,
there were precedents of such doubts regarding Trent among Catholics),
acceptance of the Council of Trent need not be demanded of Protestants as a
condition of acceptance into the Roman Catholic communion (A I,v,I2f.; cf.
LA 130).
How then would disagreements be resolved between those who accepted
and those who rejected the Council of Trent? At this point Leibniz credited
Rojas with an insight into the Protestant position. The most widely accepted
of the Protestant creeds, according to Leibniz, was the Augsburg Confession
of 1530. It was also the most conciliatory toward Catholics, though Leibniz
does not compare it with other Protestant confessions on that point. And in
the Augsburg Confession the German Protestant princes declared themselves
willing "in full obedience, even beyond what is required, to participate in" a
legitimate general council of the Church, which they petitioned the Emperor
and the Pope to convene. 8 Rojas proposed to the Protestants that, in keeping
with this undertaking of their ancestors, they enter into a preliminary but
binding reunion with the Roman Church, in which they would not be held to
the decisions of the Council of Trent, but outstanding disagreements would
be resolved by a future council that they would regard as legitimate. These
two ideas, that of a preliminary reunion, and that of a future ecumenical
council to settle the most important issues left open in the preliminary agreements, constitute the heart of the reunion strategy from its beginnings with
Rojas to its end in the failure of Leibniz's correspondence with Bossuet.
Rojas visited the courts of several German Protestant princes, inquiring
whether these proposals might be acceptable to them, and what would constitute a council that they would regard as legitimate (A I,v, 13f.). In several
courts he was received with great suspicion and was unable to engage the
Protestant theologians in fruitful discussion (A I, v, 18). In Hannover, however, he received a warm reception, which must be understood in relation to
the political situation in Hannover and the theological situation in Lower
Saxony as a whole. The Duke in Hannover, when Rojas visited first, in 1676
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and 1679, was Johann Friedrich, a convert to Catholicism who practiced his
religion privately but did not disturb the official Lutheranism of his duchy.9
He had obvious reasons for his deep interest in church reunion. By 1683 he
had been succeeded by his brother Ernst August, who was Lutheran, but less
devout and more political in his interest in these matters. His hope (eventually fulfilled) of gaining Electoral status for himself and his heirs disposed
him to be rather forthcoming toward the Emperor's emissary, Rojas. He
"ordered his Theologians, of the court as well as of the university, to enter
into negotiation with the Bishop of Tina" (A I,v,18).
These theologians, on their own account, might have been expected to be
more favorably disposed than most Lutherans toward Rojas's project; and at
least one of them was. There was a university at Helmstedt, which Hannover
shared with the other two principalities into which the Guelph family had
divided the original territory of Lower Saxony (nominally of Brunswick). Its
theological faculty was Lutheran and dominated, in the last three quarters of
the seventeenth century, by the theology of Georg Calixt (1586-1656), which
also served, through the second half of the century, as the more or less official
theology of the Guelph courts. In his time Calixt was German Lutheranism's
most important representative of the humanistic tendency in Melanchthon's
thought. He accorded a major role to philosophy in his theology, and was
known for his irenic or ecumenical stance toward the Catholic and Reformed
communions. His irenicism was the object of a furious attack by more conservative Lutheran theologians, principally from Upper Saxony and East
Prussia. What became known as the "Syncretism Controversy" began with
an argument at a conference in 1645, at which Calixt's affirmation that Calvinists should be regarded as "true Christians" enraged Abraham Calov, who
became his chief opponent;lO and Calixt was even more fiercely attacked for
friendliness toward Catholicism.
Calixt's influence in Lower Saxony represented a respectfulness and openness to dialogue across religious lines that was uncommon in seventeenth
century Europe-a point that was very important to Leibniz. Its importance
should not be underestimated in trying to understand the persistence of his
allegiance to Lutheranism and to Hannover. Leibniz was certainly an admirer
of Calixt, claiming to have been so from earliest youth; 11 and the two most
important Lutheran theologians in the Hannover negotiations of 1683 stood
even closer to Calixt. One was his son, Friedrich Ulrich Calixt, professor of
theology at Helmstedt and his father's principal defender. The other was
Gerhard Wolter Molanus (1633-1722), the Director of the Lutheran state
church of the duchy of Hannover, who had studied under Georg Calixt at
Helmstedt. 12 Molanus was an extremely high-church Lutheran who, as Abbott
of the Lutheran monastery of Loccum, reintroduced a version of the Rule of
St. Benedict, including regular hours of conventual prayer and a rule (though
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not a perpetual vow) of celibacy for the abbot and monks.13 He became
Rojas's principal Lutheran discussion partner, and later Leibniz's principal
collaborator in a series of efforts for the reunion of the churches.
The main lines of the reunion project had been laid down by Rojas and
Molanus before Leibniz was significantly involved in the negotiations.
Though Molanus saw himself as continuing the Calixtine tradition, his strategy for reunion differed consciously from that of the elder Calixt. The latter
had hoped to reconcile the churches on the basis that only the creeds of the
first five Christian centuries, which they held in common, were fundamental,
and that other, later developments of doctrine were not important enough to
divide them. Molanus, in contrast,14 proposed to give full weight to characteristically Catholic and characteristically Protestant doctrines, and try to find
a way to reconcile them. This is the meaning of the formula he adopted from
his earliest discussions with Rojas, that reunion should take place salvis
principiis utriusque partis [preserving the principles of both parties].1s
Rojas met with a much less favorable reception from F. U. Calixt than from
Molanus. The younger Calixt suspected that no real concession was being
offered from the Catholic side-partly because it was unclear what ecclesiastical authorization Rojas had for his proposals, and partly because what
was proposed involved the Protestants submitting to the authority of the
Roman Catholic hierarchy before the future council would make clear the
ultimate dispositon of disputed issues. It seems that most Lutherans who
heard of the negotiations shared these fears.16
Molanus can hardly have been unconcerned about these points, and attempted to deal with them in a document entitled Method of Restoring Ecclesiastical Union between Romans and Protestants. The Method embraced
the fundamental ideas of the preliminary union and the future ecumenical
council. Molanus was even prepared (like Leibniz) to grant the infallibility
of such a counciJ,l7 but insisted that its legitimacy depended on the Superintend ants of the Protestant churches having seats and votes in it (A I,iv,505;
cf. v,19f.). The other, even more important safeguard proposed by Molanus
for the Protestants is found in his division of controversial issues into four
classes. The first class was the crucial one; it consisted of points on which
the Protestants refused to compromise or allow any uncertainty for the decision of a future council, demanding guarantees from the Pope in advance.
The second class of issues were those to be treated as merely verbal, including
"the question of the number of the sacraments, and whether in the sacrament
of the altar there is a sacrifice properly speaking." A third group of issues
were those regarded as disputed within one or both of the churches, such as
the merit of good works and the immaculate conception of Mary; these should
be more easily settled. The fourth and final class were the fairly important
issues that need not be an obstacle to the initial union but should be decided
by a future council (A I,v,19; cf. iv,504f.).
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The Method constituted, in the view of Molanus and Leibniz, the substance
of the Lutheran response that was presented by Duke Ernst August to Rojas
with the signatures of four Lutheran theologians, two from Hannover including Molanus, and two from Helmstedt including F. U. Calixt. Even under
pressure from the Duke, however, F. U. Calixt was apparently unwilling to
sign the Method as a free-standing document; so what the four theologians
signed was a more complex, and more ambiguous, dossier of documents from
their conference. IS Rojas did not sign any of these documents, and it is
important to recognize that the Method did not represent an agreement between him and the Lutherans of Hannover. It was a Protestant document,
and represented a Protestant move in the negotiations (A l,iii,576f.; cf.
297,316f.). That it was never met with an official countermove from Rome
was ascribed by Molanus to the politically motivated opposition of the French
cardinals. 19 The Protestant proposal presented by Leibniz and Molanus to
Bossuet in 1691, in hopes of winning a more favorable French response to
their project, was still essentially that of the Method (OCB IV,470-82).
The question our present investigation prompts us to ask about the Method
is how it is related to Leibniz's Examination of the Christian Religion. One
of the great Leibniz scholars of our century described the Examination as
marked by "agreement with the signed declarations of Molanus,"2o but I am
more struck by the disagreement between them. What is most striking is that
the nonnegotiable points claimed as most important for Protestants in Molanus's Method are not in general assured to them in the Examination. They
are: "[ 1] communion under both species, [2] the rejection of private masses,21
[3] the justification of the sinner, [4] the marriage of Ecclesiatics, [5] the
validity of the ordinations that are performed among them,22 ... and ... [6]
the Episcopal rights of the protestant princes" (A l,v,19).23
The most theological of these points, and the most central for Lutherans,
is "the justification of the sinner." Its role in the Method, in the Examination,
and in the projects of Molanus and Leibniz is complex, and will be taken up
in the next section of this paper. The other five demands, pertaining to
ecclesiastical practice, are clearly not honored in the Examination. (1) The
Examination hints that it would be advisable to permit the historically Protestant peoples to have communion under both species, but more firmly advises Protestants to submit to whatever the Pope may decide in this matter
(Exam 145). (2) The Protestant rejection of private masses is condemned
(Exam 157f.). (4) It is hinted that it would be good to permit marriage of
priests, but the one firm conclusion is that the Protestants should endure the
requirement of clerical celibacy as long as it seems right to "the Rulers of
the Church" (Exam 187f.). And (5) while the validity of Protestant ordinations is not discussed, the discussion most relevant to it concludes with the
rather Catholic admonition that it is safest not to attempt a "private" answer
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to such questions nor to depart from the historic, Apostolic succession of
ordinations (VE 2489 = Exam 179). (6) "The Episcopal rights of the protestant princes" are not discussed in the Examination; Leibniz seems to have
regarded the issue as merely political (A I,iv,509).
Of course, the Examination presents itself as a Catholic document, whereas
the nonnegotiable demands were a Protestant position to which Rojas never
committed himself, though Leibniz seems to have believed in 1687 that he
was prepared to grant the substance of most of them (A I,v,17). It is therefore
noteworthy that the Examination does not even incorporate the most fundamental features of the strategy on which Rojas and Molanus were agreed,
though it does envisage a return of Protestants to the Roman Church. The
Examination makes no mention of a preliminary reunion, or of reserving
disputed points to a future ecumenical council. It appeals to the authority of
the Council of Trent (e.g., Exam 183). Among the issues that Molanus's
Method (as Leibniz understood it) would reserve to a future council are those
of "purgatory, the limits of the Pope's authority, ... the manner of the real
presence, ... the cult of the saints, relics and images, oricular confession"
(A I, v,19). Where the Examination discusses these issues, it generally decides them in a recognizably Catholic framework, with some provisions that
could be regarded as concessions to Protestants-for instance, that they need
not adopt the use of religious images (Exam 89f.), and that the Pope is to be
obeyed "in everything that we judge, examining ourselves, can be done without sin and in conscience, even to the point that in doubt, other things equal,
obedience should be judged safer"-which seems to leave a wide territory
for conscientious dissent (VE 2487 = Exam 173). (See Exam 199f. on purgatory, 125-39 on the real presence, 91-113 on the cult of the saints, 113 on
relics, 69-91 on images, and 159-67 on sacramental confession.) Even if
these judgments represent the way in which Leibniz thought a future council
would or should decide the questions, it remains the case that presenting a
resolution of these issues in advance is no part of the reunion strategy that
Leibniz said he found uniqely promising. The point is important in the
historical context; in 1694 Leibniz communicated to Rojas that Molanus
could not support a certain document because it "defines very freely almost
all controversies, which the [Hannover] Conference judged cannot yet be
done" (A I,x,154).
The Examination cannot have been conceived as a document to which
Protestants and Catholics would agree, for Leibniz must have known that
there was not the slightest hope of obtaining Protestant assent to it. Molanus
was probably the most ecumenically conciliatory Lutheran ecclesiastic
known to Leibniz, and he seems never to have been prepared to concede much
more to the Catholics than was conceded in his Method. Leibniz was well
aware that even those concessions exposed Molanus to Lutheran suspicions
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of having sold out to Catholicism, as news of the negotiations in Hannover
leaked out in 1683 and 1684.24
To be sure, Leibniz never expected immediate success for the strategy of
Rojas and Molanus (A I,v, 11), having been initially rather pessimistic about
it (A l,iii,288). Like Molanus, Rojas was suspected by his coreligionists of
having conceded too much to the other side (see, e.g., A I,iii,297). In these
matters, Leibniz thought, "one must proceed by steps" (A l,x,151). The
Protestant proposals of Molanus's Method could expect, at best, to meet with
a Catholic counter-proposal that would offer the Protestants less than the
Method demanded. Could the Examination have been conceived as that
Catholic counter-proposal? Not plausibly, I think. It is too stingy toward the
Protestants to play that part, as it does not even incorporate the most basic
proposals with which Rojas had approached the Protestants.
We are not left to mere speculation regarding the shape of the counter-offer
that Leibniz hoped to see from the Catholic side. A decade having passed
with no such response, Leibniz wrote in October 1694 to prod Rojas gently
to be as forthcoming as the Hannover Lutherans had been (A I,x, 154). As a
next "step," he suggested, Rojas should compose and send to him and Molanus "something accommodated to the principles of the Hannover conference, as if originating from Hungarian or other Protestants" (A I,x,155). It
would be important for such a document not to transgress the "limits" or
"lines" laid down in that meeting, presumably in the Method (A I,x, 151,154).
Leibniz and Molanus would revise the text and arrange for its publication, in
due time, with the sort of official permission commonly granted to theological
books by the dean of a Lutheran theological faculty. They in turn would
compose a similarly pseudonymous statement from a Catholic point of view
and send it to Rojas for revision and publication with the normal Catholic
ecclesiastical approval (A I,x,155). Whatever else Leibniz may have hoped
to achieve in this way, it provided him with a tactful occasion to send Rojas
his own draft of the next step he thought should be taken from the Catholic
side, which he did in a document, approved by Molanus, entitled Judgment
of a Catholic Doctor about the Discussion of Reunion recently held with
certain Protestant Theologians (A I,x,155,156-69).
The Judgment does not grant the Protestants everything on which Molanus
insisted in the Method. It expresses vehement opposition to the suggestion
that "the Protestants with whom lRojasj dealt want certain controversies to
be excluded even from the authority of a future Council, and not to be
submitted to the judgment of the Church, but to remain forever in suspension," but relies on the hope that the Protestant proposals need not be interpreted in such a sense (A I,x,165f.). It seems to me disingenuous of Leibniz
to suggest such a hope to the Catholics, but it is clear, in any event, that he
did not expect the Catholics, at the next step, to grant the Protestants guar-
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antees, up front, on nonnegotiable issues. On the substance of those issues,
however, the Judgment, unlike the Examination, denies the Protestants little.
The questions of "conceding communion under both species and marriage of
the Clergy" to the Protestants are mentioned in a conciliatory tone, and it is
suggested that the negotiations to date show Protestants and Catholics differing only verbally about justification (A I,x,157f.); the other nonnegotiable
items of the Method are not mentioned at all.
The Judgment insists on "the authority of the Catholic Church," and especially of its ecumenical councils, but in terms that Molanus and Leibniz were
prepared to accept (A I,x,158-62). Most important, it argues vigorously for
the two basic features of the Rojas-Molanus strategy. (1) It argues that a
future ecumenical council should be allowed to decide outstanding controversies, including issues thought by Catholics to have been decided at Trent,
commenting that "we Catholics ought not to fear that the Holy Spirit will
change its mind or pronounce otherwise in a new Council than as it defined
in an old one" (A I,x,162-65). (2) It also argues that the Pope is able, in
principle, to let Protestants enter the Roman communion on an "interim"
basis, "keeping their opinions, which would be referred to the ultimate decision of the Council." In this matter, says the fictitious author, "I would favor
the power of the Pontiff rather ... than confine it without compelling reason"
(A I,x,166-68). The text of the Judgment joins the correspondence with
Bossuet as evidence that Leibniz thought the next step in the reunion process
should be to persuade Catholics of the appropriateness of these two policies.
By comparison with the Judgment, the Examination seems simply irrelevant
to the reunion process that Leibniz envisaged. 2s
There remains, perhaps, a possibility that the Examination was meant to
contribute to church reunion more indirectly, by planting conciliatory
thoughts in the minds of Catholic readers. It does tend to minimize Protestant-Catholic disagreements, emphasizes the importance of avoiding abuses
in such practices as veneration of the saints and the use of religious images,
and suggests that concessions could well be made to Protestants (though it
does not promise them) in such matters as communion under both species
and marriage of the clergy. This cannot be absolutely excluded as a motive
for the work; but if propaganda for such ideas were a major motive, we might
have expected a more vigorous persuasive effort on their behalf, which Leibniz certainly had the skill to present, even in a context of pseudonymous
deference to Roman authority, as the Judgment shows.

2. The Love of God Above All Things
If the Examination had little or nothing to contribute to Leibniz's large ec-

clesiastical schemes, perhaps it should be viewed as a more personal document. There are several indications in Leibniz's letters to Count Ernst that
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one of his main concerns in the famous correspondence with Arnauld that
passed through the Count's hands was to ascertain whether Arnauld believed
that one who professed the philosophical opinions that Leibniz presented to
Arnauld could or "could not be tolerated in the Catholic Church" (LA 131;
cf. LA 15f.,21,103 and A I,v,149). He had earlier indicated to Ernst that he
was deterred from joining the Roman communion because he feared that
certain "philosophical opinions, of which [he believed he had] a demonstration" would not be tolerated in that church (A I,iv,320f.).26 It is presumably
these "philosophical opinions," or closely related ones, that Leibniz wrote
down for Arnauld to read in the Discourse on Metaphysics. We may be
tempted by the hypothesis that the Examination presents Leibniz's own opinions and was written, like the Discourse, to be read by a Catholic theologian
who could tell Leibniz whether his views would be tolerated in the Roman
Church. Perhaps Arnauld would have seen the Examination if his response
to Leibniz's opinions on the presumably less risky topics of the Discourse
had been more favorable (though the Examination would presumably have
been written in French if it had been intended primarily for Arnauld). On
this hypothesis the Examination is a personal profession of faith, composed
for the purpose of testing the possibility of Leibniz's individual conversion
to Roman Catholicism.
In support of this reading it can be noted that distinctively Leibnizian views
are expressed in the Examination. Issues of theodicy are treated in terms of
God's choice among possible substances and their complete individual concepts, in a way that is strikingly reminiscent of the Discourse (Exam 7,27f.).
The immortality of the human soul is defended on the basis of a recognizably
Leibnizian doctrine of simple substance (Exam 19lf.). And direct causal
interaction between mind and body and, more broadly, among created substances is denied in very Leibnizian terms (Exam 93f.).
In addition to these metaphysical features, the Examination has Leibnizian
traits in its view of religion. One of the most important of these, and one of
the riskiest from the point of view of both Catholic and Protestant orthodoxy,
is the development of a theology of love. 27 Leibniz identified "the love of
God above all things" as "the principle of true religion" (Gr 161). This means
loving God
not only for the sake of the goods that he distributes to us, but for his own
sake' and as an ultimate end. For this is the nature of true love in general,
which is called friendship's [love], that we locate our own happiness and
perfection in the happiness and perfection of the object loved, partly, that is,
if the object is of finite perfection ... , but entirely, if it is of the highest
excellence and goodness (VE 2428 = Exam 39).28

The happier and more perfect the object, the more happiness can be found in
loving it. Love for God, Leibniz inferred, is the most reliable source of
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happiness or joy. "Divine love, moreover, surpasses other loves because God
can be loved with the greatest success, since nothing is happier than God,
and at the same time nothing more beautiful or worthier of happiness can be
understood" (G III,387/L 422; cf. G VI,27rr 51).
Also since God is the most perfect and the happiest, and consequently the
most lovable, of substances, and since true, pure Love consists in the state
that makes one taste pleasure in the perfections and in the happiness of that
which one loves, this Love must give us the greatest pleasure of which one
can be capable when God is its object (PNG 16).
Leibniz's conception of love for God has a pronounced rationalistic and
indeed Stoic aspect. Those who love God above all things
never murmur against the divine will, knowing that everything must issue in
good for those who love God,29 and just as they are content with past things,
they try likewise regarding future things to do whatever they judge to agree
with the presumed will of God (VE 2412 = Exam 5).
The best foundation for the love of God above all things is rational demonstration of the divine perfection (Gr 8f.; Cf. G VI,27-29/T 51-53). Some of
Leibniz's papers evince an evangelistic zeal for propagation of the love of
God through philosophical instruction (Gr 7-17, VE 1786-1823, both from
the period 1677-82); and his Theodicy is plainly animated by a concern to
establish views that will sustain love for God (G V1,29/T 53; cf. DM 2-5).
Leibniz understood his relation to Luther in terms of his own persistent
emphasis on the love of God above all things.
And if, in accordance with that voice of Staupitz that Luther said excited
him, one locates the whole force of true penitence, conversion, justification,
renewal, and finally of good works, in true charity or divine love, to what
else does one refer but that living faith that Protestants locate not so much
in the intellect as in the will-that is, filial trust that is conceived from the
immense goodness of God and the benefits conferred through [God's] son,
and is efficacious through an ardor for obedience? (A I,vii,274)
A similar interpretation of Luther is implied in the Examination where Leibniz says that the view of those "who place the whole force of justification in
Faith alone" can be accepted if it is understood that they
have another notion of faith than that which was formerly received in [scholastic thought]; for they place faith not only in the intellect, but also in the
will; indeed they extend the nature of faith so far as to include filial trust
toward God, in which charity or love [dilectio] of God seems to me to be
involved (Exam 33f.).
I think Leibniz was aware that this interpretation of justifying faith was
novel and controversial in relation to Lutheran theology. The addition of "to
me" as a conscious afterthought (VE 2426) in the last clause of the passage
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just quoted pinpoints the place at which Leibniz steps over a line that even
the Calixts had been careful not to cross. That justifying faith is a matter of
trust [fiducial. and hence a function of the will, was a commonplace of
Lutheran thought. 30 But it is no part of Lutheran theology that faith, as an act
of will, includes charity. According to the Calixtine theology faith, justification, and charity occur at the same time in the person that is being justified,
but whereas faith is an instrumental cause of justification, charity is an effect
of it. Thus they are distinct, though inseparable in God's plan of salvation. 3l
This point was very important to Friedrich Ulrich Calixt in defending his
father against the charge of having betrayed the Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith alone [sola fide]. Calov accused the elder Calixt of abandoning the thesis that "faith does not justify because it is formed or efficacious
through charity." The younger Calixt replied that his father had stated that
"by the the gratuitous gift and kindness of of God we attain eternal life by
the intervention of faith, indeed, but not of faith under that concept [ratio]
by which it is a more or less perfect virtue, but rather under that by which
we apprehend the Divine promises and rest on the merit of Christ."32
As I noted in the previous section, Molanus listed the Lutheran doctrine of
"the justification of the sinner" among the nonnegotiable points that Protestants must be assured they would not have to give up. In the structure of his
Method these essential points are contrasted with the second class of issues,
which are merely verbal. In fact, however, the place of justification in the
church reunion strategy, for Molanus as well as for Leibniz, was more complex than their summaries of the Method would suggest. In the full statement
of the Private Thoughts that he prepared for Bossuet in 1691, Molanus still
insists that the Pope must "leave intact and unimpaired" to the Protestant
churches "the doctrine of the justification of the sinful human being before
God," but nevertheless argues that there is no reason for the Pope to refuse
this concession because it can be seen now that the whole disagreement is
"not about the thing, but about the diverse understanding of terms" (OCB
IV,472).
This thought, that the dispute about justification can be resolved as merely
verbal, was by the 1690's, if not earlier, part of Leibniz's and Molanus's
strategy for the reunion of the churches (A l,x,158). It is found also in the
Examination; and the explanation that Leibniz gives there is essentially the
same that Molanus would offer Bossuet. If by the question, how a sinner is
justified, we mean how one is freed from guilt, both sides will agree with the
Protestants that we are justified by "the satisfaction of Christ imputed to us."
But if by justification we mean being made just in one's actual moral disposition, both sides will agree with the Catholics that "that trait [habitus] of
justice is infused in us by God in regeneration" (Exam 31f.; cf. OCB IV,472).
In his Private Thoughts for Bossuet, Molanus goes on to treat the issue

530

Faith and Philosophy

whether "faith alone justifies" as merely verbal. "Faith alone" can be accepted as long as it does not mean faith that is "destitute of good works, or
at least of good intent." Justifying faith is faith that "works through charity."
This has a certain similarity to the treatment of the "faith alone" doctrine in
Leibniz's Examination, but Molanus does not imply, as Leibniz does, that the
charity "through" which the faith works is part of the faith rather than an
effect of it. Molanus does not explicitly address that issue, but seems to
imply that the faith and the charity are distinct, inasmuch as he holds that
faith plays a causal role that charity does not play in justification (OCB
IV,476).
The view of justification advocated in the Examination was pretty clearly
Leibniz's own (cf. A l,iv420; vii,497). His attempt to integrate the doctrine
of justification by faith into an essentially love-based soteriology led him, on
this crucial point, outside the Lutheran tradition, even in its conciliatory
Calixtine form, and arguably beyond any doctrinal basis that his associate
Molanus was prepared to embrace for church reunion. There is no doubt that
Leibniz's piety breathes a very different spirit from Luther's. He had far less
sympathy for Luther's concerns about justification, and a much less profound
understanding of them, than Kant had, for example, though he was superficially more respectful toward Lutheran orthodoxy than Kant was. Like
Luther, Leibniz was concerned to establish faith in God's love toward creatures. But whereas for Luther this meant, famously, a desire to find a gracious God, the form of God's love that most concerned Leibniz was not grace
but justice-justice, according to Leibniz's standard definition, being "the
charity of the wise," and thus a form of love (G 1,73).
Much in Luther's theology responds to his keen sense of being concretely,
persistently, and as a Christian still a sinner (simul justus et peccator). In
relation to this consciousness of sin, Luther's felt need was for grace, not
justice. Luther's sense of sin is not prominently present in the Examination,
or more generally in Leibniz's writings. Leibniz does accept a doctrine of
original sin and a need for divine redemption (Exam 7-11); but the Examination's view of original sin is much closer to the Council of Trent than to
Luther and Melanchthon, inasmuch as it denies that original sin remains in
the regenerate (Exam 4lf.)-something that Georg Calixt did not deny even
though he adopted much of the Scholastic framework that inspired Trent's
decisions about the subject. 33
Leibniz's view of ordinary human capacities is much more optimistic than
Luther's. He takes a dim view of the actual religious performance of most
people, but insists on the capacity of reason to lead us to the love of God
above all things, provided that God gives us the gift of "serious attention"
(Gr 7-10). Likewise he seems less concerned about our need for grace than
about the danger of compromising the divine justice and lovableness by
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ascribing to God any merely arbitrary treatment of people (A I,vi,120). This
concern about justice makes it credible that the Examination's rather Catholic
endorsement of the merit of good works represents Leibniz's own view.
Retributive justice would not strictly require so great a reward as eternal
happiness for those who love God, but such a reward "is congruent with God's
justice." And "it belongs to distributive justice that not only some ... but
all of those who love God should be admitted to eternal bliss" (VE 2434 =
Exam 53). Leibniz had indeed stated to Count Ernst that in regard to justification "the sentiments of some Catholics seem to me more reasonable than
those of some protestants. For charity rather than faith puts a man in a state
of grace," though as we have seen, Leibniz thinks that charity can be incorporated in faith (A I,iii,261; cf. Gr 27).
At one point, however, Leibniz's emphasis on God's justice and its relation
to human love for God led him in a direction that would stretch the boundaries
of Catholic as well as Protestant orthodoxy. Both his conception of divine
justice and the intrinsic connection he saw between happiness and the love
of God above all things gave him reason to regard such love for God as both
necessary and sufficient for salvation. Its sufficiency claims special attention
here. Leibniz evidently approved the doctrine that he ascribed to "several
very authoritative Theologians in the Roman Church itself," that "a sincere
Act of love of God above all things suffices for salvation, when it is aroused
by the grace of Jesus Christ" (G VI,156/T 176; cf. Gr 167). This idea
grounded Leibniz's persistent opposition to the idea that there is no salvation
outside the Roman Catholic Church. "So men of good will are saved.
Whence it follows that either there is no man of good will outside the Roman
Church, or else a good will suffices for salvation even outside it" (Or 158;
cf. Gr 206f.,216).
Leibniz was prepared to carry the argument further, however. About 1678
or 1679 he wrote a little dialogue whose characters are Poliandre, a Catholic
missionary proselytizing among the Protestants, and Theophile, "a very honorable man of the Augsburg Confession" (VE 2661L 213); the Lutheran character is painted much more sympathetically than the Catholic. Theophile
suggests it should be beyond controversy that loving God above all things
suffices for salvation. He infers that the issues disputed between Catholics
and Protestants are less than crucial. Poliandre initially objects, on the
ground that
A pagan Philosopher can love God above all things, since reason can teach
him that God is a being infinitely perfect and supremely lovable. But he will
not be a Christian for all that, for perhaps he will not have heard of Jesus
Christ, without whom there is no salvation. Therefore love of God does not
suffice. (VE 2671L 213f.)

In many contexts of Protestant/Catholic controversy this would have been an
effective objection, for Protestants have been no less insistent than Catholics
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on relationship to Jesus Christ as necessary for salvation. The objection
depends, of course, on the premise that "a pagan Philosopher can love God
above all things." Leibniz (in the person of Theophile) shows no interest in
attacking that premise, however. It is, after all, a thesis that might be inferred
from his own belief in philosophy as a means of fostering love for God. In
fact he clearly believed it (Gr 161). Rather he questions the assumption that
the pagan philosopher will not be related to Christ in the necessary way.
This question of the salvation of the pagans is too much for me. However I
like very much the thought of certain learned and pious Theologians, who
believe that God will enlighten al\ who sincerely seek him, at least at the
point of death, by revealing to them, even internal\y, what they must know
about Jesus Christ-according to this incontestable rule: that God does not
refuse his grace to those who do what depends on them. (VE 267fL 214)

At this point Poliandre abandons his objection. Not wishing "to combat
sentiments that seem to [him] well suited to reconcile piety with reason," he
is "quite willing to grant you that the love of God above all things suffices
when it is taken from that angle" (VE 267/L 214). For the rest of the dialogue
Poliandre labors to establish that one who really does love God, and knows
about the Roman Catholic Church, will want to become part of that church.
This is a line of argument with which Leibniz has more sympathy although
(in the person of Theophile, at any rate) he is not convinced by it.
Leibniz clearly liked these ideas about the salvation of enlightened and
virtuous pagans. Similar treatments of the topic recur often in his writings
throughout his career (e.g., VE 2553f.; Gr 235,346,456; A I,vii,434f.; cf. NE
510).34 Well known in his own time was the memorandum with which Leibniz
initiated his correspondence with the Catholic convert Paul Pelisson-Fontanier, a document published by Pelisson in 1691 with Leibniz's blessing.
There Leibniz discusses, noncommittally but with evident sympathy, a view
that he ascribes to "several great men of the Roman Church."35 On this view,
"one can be saved in all the Religions, provided that one truly loves God
above all things with a friendship-love based on his infinite perfections."
This thesis is applied even to people who have sinned, on the ground that
"contrition, that is to say, the penitence that comes from that sincere love,
effaces sins without any intervention of the keys of the Church or the Sacrament." There is no mention here of the hypothesis that pagans so graced will
be enlightened about Christ at the moment of death; but it is part of the view
that they are illumined by the light that is Christ, and are "tightly united with
the eternal Word, and with the divine wisdom that is in Jesus Christ, even if
they would not know him according to the flesh, and even if they would never
have heard of that assemblage of letters that form his name" (A I,vi,78f.).
Leibniz evinces great caution in this discussion. He emphasizes that the
view is one "that the Protestant Theologians do not approve," and he presents
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it only as worthy of discussion as one of two possible solutions to a problem.
In a marginal note commenting on the printed version he complains of Pelisson's ignoring the other alternative and focusing on this view, "which I
employed ... only ad hominem, because it is admissible according to the
principles of the Jesuits" (A I,vi,78). Both the length and the tone of Leibniz's discussion, however, gave Pelisson plenty of reason to assume that
Leibniz was more interested in the view offering salvation in all religions,
than in the alternative.
The next month Leibniz wrote bluntly to Count Ernst that belief in the
damnation of all pagans "yields thoughts that are not very compatible with
the goodness and justice of God." An earlier, even more assertive draft of
this letter declares, "I could not believe that all those who have not known
Jesus Christ according to the Gospel preached in the world will be lost
without resource no matter how they have lived," and comments, "I don't
know why we take so much pleasure in believing people damned. Isn't there
here a little vanity and a bit of the corruption of the human heart, which finds
a secret joy in the ills of others, in lifting itself above so many people that
one believes wretched?" (A I,vi,107f.; cf. Gr SOl)
In his Theodicy of 1710 Leibniz returns to the idea of a private revelation
of Christ, granted at the moment of death. Confronting the objection that
"there has been, and still is, an infinity of human beings among the civilized
peoples and among the barbarians who have never had that knowledge of
God and of Jesus Christ that one needs in order to be saved by the ordinary
ways," he responds that "the fact can be doubted, for how do we know
whether they do not receive ordinary or extraordinary assistance that is unknown to us?" (G VI,155fT 175f.) It is safest, he grants, to teach that "today
a knowledge of Jesus Christ according to the flesh is absolutely necessary
for salvation," but since "we cannot know what passes in souls at the point
of death," why should we deny that the necessary knowledge of Christ is
given at that point in appropriate cases? "So there are an infinity of paths
open to God that give him means of satisfying both his justice and his goodness" (G VI,157fT 177). In the Theodicy Leibniz endorses this solution in
his own voice. "Thus," he declares, "one grants neither the damnation of
infants who die without baptism or outside the Church, nor the damnation of
adults who have acted according to the lights that God has given them." And
if such an adult had lacked any necessary light "during his life, he would
receive it at least at the point of death" (G VI,384fT 385).
Leibniz suggests that this view may be more acceptable to Catholic than
to Protestant orthodoxy, the former being less insistent than the latter on
explicit faith in Christ (G VI, 156fT 176; cf. A I,vi, 119; Gr 202); but he surely
knew that the position would seem daring in either communion. The noncommittal caution with which he laid it before Pelisson suggests that he can
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hardly have been surprised at the vehemence with which Pelisson rejected it
(A I,vi,91-101,124-26), though Leibniz claimed that it was more widely supported in the Roman Church (especially by the Jesuits) than Pelisson would
admit (A I,vi,119-21,126n). Nonetheless, this relatively daring view is
plainly asserted in the Examination, which in general exalts "the love of God
above all things" as the highest of religious virtues (Exam 5,39).36
Moreover God gives sufficient grace to all human beings so that, given only
their own serious volition, nothing further is wanted for their salvation that
is not in [their] power. And therefore many pious men have been persuaded
that every human being coming into this world is so enlightened by that light
of minds, the eternal Son of God, and by his Holy Spirit, that at least before
death, whether by external preaching or by internal illumination of the mind,
he arrives at as much knowledge as was sufficient and necessary so that he
could obtain salvation if only he himself willed [itl; with the end, of course,
that if he obstinately resists God's call, he is at least rendered without excuse;
for divine justice definitely demands this. By what scheme God assures this,
however, even in those whom no suggestion of the Gospel of Christ reaches
by any preaching of the external word, is not to be rashly defined by us, but
left to his wisdom and mercy. (Exam 27; cf. VE 2422f.)

Likewise the condemnation of unbaptized infants to Hell is firmly rejected
in the Examination (p. 9), as elsewhere in Leibniz's writings. He does not
go so far here as to claim salvation for such infants; the doctrine of limbo,
involving a loss of bliss but no infliction of suffering, is seen as consistent

with divine justice (Exam 195), presumably because these infants have not
attained to actual love for God. This agrees also with Leibniz's statements
in the Theodicy (G VI,153IT 173).
This development of his doctrine of love for God "above all things," with
its implications for the eternal destiny of persons not known to us as Christians, constitutes the boldest self-assertion vis-a-vis Catholic orthodocy that
Leibniz ventures in the Examination. I think it likely that of all the controversial issues in Christian theology, this was the one about which he cared
most deeply. If there is any point on which the Examination is plausibly read
as a trial balloon intended to test the acceptability of Leibniz's views in the
Church of Rome, this is it.
Even in this system of ideas, however, it may be doubted whether the
Examination is completely faithful to Leibniz's beliefs. The doubt arises with
respect to the question whether love for God above all things is not only
sufficient but necessary for salvation, and particularly with regard to a question about penitence. In the Examination (pp. 117, 163f.) as elsewhere, Leibniz insists (with Catholic precedent) that an act of perfect contrition, which
involves love for God above all things, suffices for reconcilation with God,
even without sacramental confession (provided, here, that the sacrament is
not despised). "The weighty question remains," whether such perfect con-
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trition is required, "or whether attrition suffices"-attrition being "an imperfect penitence, which is born, not of pure love for God, but of fear of punishment or hope of eternal life, and other similar causes." Attrition is
admittedly unable of itself to lead to justification. But it is argued that the
sacrament of confession and absolution ought to confer some benefit on the
faithful over and above what they could obtain without it by an act of perfect
contrition, and that this benefit is that they can receive forgiveness with a
less perfect act of attrition, which would be quite insufficient without the
sacrament. In the Examination (p. 163f.) Leibniz accepts this argument and
admits the sufficiency of attrition in the context of sacramental confession,
"most rightly in the sense of the Council of Trent."
Leibniz himself had written quite unfavorably about this view a few years
before he penned the Examination. In 1681 he wrote to Count Ernst, "I have
always extremely approved the sentiment of those who doubt very much that
one can be justified by attrition alone with the sacrament without ever making
an act of sovereign love for God," and he seems to favor "those who believe
that love for God above all things is necessary for salvation" (A l,iii,261).
And Theophile, in the dialogue cited above, thinks the opinion of the sufficiency of attrition, with the sacrament, is astonishingly dangerous; "the Jansenists show its absurdity" eVE 269). If the Jansenist Arnauld was part of
the intended audience of the Examination, the acceptance of the sufficiency
of attrition, as distinct from contrition, in sacramental penance, can hardly
have been calculated to please him. For as late as 20 May 1688, writing to
Count Ernst, Leibniz instances "the necessity of contrition" as a Jansenist
doctrine that Arnauld "cannot disavow so easily" in controversy with the
Jesuits (A l,v,148).
Had Leibniz changed his mind on this issue when he wrote the Examination? I doubt that I have found all the texts in which Leibniz discusses the
subject, but those that I have seen do not exactly speak with one voice. A
document perhaps contemporaneous with the Examination does not mention
the issue, but seems to presuppose the position taken in Examination, since
it instances a need for "new contrition" when one sins as a hazardous feature
of exclusion from the "visible Catholic Church" (VE 2555). In 1685, translating a dialogue by a German Catholic writer who affirms the sufficiency of
attrition in conjunction with the sacraments of baptism and confession, Leibniz comments that this would happen "by the infusion of a grace that contains
virtually what is necessary to put a man in a state of friendship towards God"
(VE 2578), which suggests an attempt to find room for compromise. In 1690
and 1691 Leibniz speaks of the sufficiency of attrition, in sacramental penance, as a doctrine of the Jesuits closely connected with the readiness of many
of them (as he believes) to affirm the sufficiency of contrition for the salva-
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tion of pagans (A I, vi,82f., 126n; vii,434). In this context Leibniz does not
explicitly endorse the sufficiency of attrition, but gives not the slightest hint
of disapproval. At the same time, however, in November 1690, he wrote to
Count Ernst that "according to me, in order to be saved one must love God"
(A I,vi, 133). The issue about attrition is not in view in the latter context; but
since attrition as such does not involve love for God, one could infer that
Leibniz would still consider it insufficient for salvation. Much later, in 1710,
speaking in a Protestant voice, Leibniz indicates that contrition, rather than
attrition, is "required by our" theologians (Gr 220). I suspect that Leibniz
was never personally convinced of the sufficiency of attrition in conjunction
with the sacraments, but that he was willing to accept it in the Examination
because he thought Catholics might see it as forming a natural package with
the belief that Protestants, and even pagans, could be saved through contrition, about which he cared much more.
3. Pragmatism in Theology
This is not the only point at which the Examination seems to reflect a sensitivity to Roman Catholic ecclesiastical politics rather than personal conviction. The long discussion of the cult of the saints in Exam 91-113, for
example, contains warnings about dangers of idolatry, but takes a tolerant
tone toward popular Catholic practices on which Leibniz had commented
quite scathingly to Count Ernst in 1683 (A I,iii,3! Of.; cf. VE 2621). The
Examination's discussion of excommunication (p. 169) concludes by stating
that the ecclesiatical hierarchy's exercise of this power is "regularly" ratified
by God. It makes no mention at all of unjust or erroneous excommunication,
though no theme is more frequent in Leibniz's correspondence with Catholics
than his comparison of the ecclesiastical situation of Protestants with that of
persons unjustly excommunicated (e.g., A I,iv,420).
Similarly, writing to Count Ernst in 1684 about the validity of the sacramental acts of Protestant ministers, Leibniz connects the issue with another,
on which he appeals to some statements of Tertullian as an ancient precedent.
He grants that "the distinction between Ecclesiastics and Laity is of divine
right." But he insists that does not mean that "in case of necessity, a layman
cannot perform the functions of a priest, so far as they are necessary for the
welfare of souls. For this divine right does not cease to be positive" (A
I,iv,335f.; cf. ibid., 357f.; A I,vi,204; VE 2551). A quarter century later, in
1710, he expresses the same view in a similar context: "according to sacred
scripture and the primitive Church, any Christian is a priest in case of necessity" (Gr 222; cf. Gr 215,221). In the Examination, however, though the
question whether any Christian can act as a priest in case of necessity is
introduced, Leibniz is much more cautious about it, concluding only that the
matter must be left to God's care, since
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it seems to me neither necessary nor safe to define these questions privately.
. .. In the mean time it is safest not to depart from the line of Ordination
that has brought the grace of ministry down to us by continuous;)ropagation
through the successors of the Apostles. (VE 2489 = Exam 179)

This is surely not, without qualification, Leibniz's own opinion, though the
attempt to resolve the matter in terms of what is "safest" is, as we shall see,
deeply characteristic of his own approach to theology.37
Leibniz's purpose in writing the Examination remains somewhat mysterious to me, inasmuch as the document is not credible either as a personal
theological confession or as a platform for reunion of the churches. Perhaps
Leibniz wanted to sketch out, for the edification of Catholics, what an enlightened, thoroughly Catholic theology would look like, though it would not
be his own personal theology. I am sure, at any rate, that mo:;t of the points
on which Leibniz simply deferred, in writing it, to prevailing Catholic opinion
were genuinely less important to him than those on which he was more
assertive.
The mystery of the Examination's purpose is akin to anothl!r that puzzled
Leibniz's Catholic correspondents: why a person who showed so much sympathy for Catholic theology did not simply convert to Catholicism. His
response to Count Ernst on this point alluded to "abuses" to which persons
joining the Roman Catholic Church might be required to consent, and to
"philosophical opinions, of which [he believed he had] a demonstration" and
which he feared might not be tolerated in the Roman communion (A
I,iv,320f.). Arnauld found it difficult to understand how Leibniz could place
so much importance on such "metaphysical speculations" (LA 16,110). But
we cannot understand Leibniz's personal religious stance unless we recognize
that, and how, he really did regard certain metaphysical speculations as more
important than the issues so hotly disputed in the usual controversies between
Catholics and Protestants. It is possible that the decline in Leibniz's personal
interest in Catholicism after the 1680's, on which I have remarked, was due
in significant measure to the intolerance he met in Arnauld's response to some
of his metaphysical views.
The structure of the Examination provides an important clue here. It begins
with about four Latin pages laying out theses of which Leibniz says that
"almost all are manifest from the very light of reason." It goes on then in
the bulk of the treatise to discuss "the secret economy of the divine plan in
restoring Human beings," which "could be learned only from God revealing"
it (VE 2415 = Exam 11). Belonging to the former category, the doctrines of
natural theology, are the being and perfections of God, the creation of the
world, the doctrine of love for God above all things and the duties arising
from it, and a doctrine of sin and expectation of redemption (Exam 3-11).
We have already seen that Leibniz held that reason alone, by philosophical

538

Faith and Philosophy

meditation, could teach one enough of the divine perfection to induce one to
love God supremely, which is the one thing needful.
The relation between reason and revelation, as Leibniz sees it, must be
grounded in reason, which must assure us of the authenticity of the revelation,
chiefly relying on two marks: on miracles wrought by the teacher, and on
"holiness of the teaching" (Gr 30; cf. Exam 11-15). It is of importance for
Leibniz's religious thought that these marks will commonly afford us only a
probability of the authenticity and truth of the revelation, whereas he thought
that many of the claims of natural theology could be demonstrated. A full
understanding of the importance of this point depends on Leibniz's views
about probability.
Writing to Thomas Burnett in 1697, Leibniz divided "theological truths and
inferences" into those that have "metaphysical certainty" and those that have
"moral certainty" (G 111,193). Moral certainty is the highest degree of probability, and Leibniz regards it as certainty for practical purposes. Indeed he
assigns all probable reasoning as such to the practical part of philosophy.
Wherever we do not have demonstrations, Leibniz thinks, the most pertinent
questions for practical reflection are questions of what it is prudent, or practically wise, to believe or assume; and he applies this view explicitly to
theology.'s This affects his approach to theology as regards (1) its mode, (2)
the priority assigned to issues within revealed theology, and (3) the priority
of metaphysics and natural theology in relation to revealed theology. All of
these points shed light on the Examination. Let us consider them in order.
(1) Although Leibniz sometimes seems prepared to treat a revelation as
"demonstrated" (Gr 30f.), we can also find him stating that "the proofs of the
christian religion are only moral, since it is impossible to give any other kind
of proof in matters of fact" (A II,i,488/L 260). Only probability, at any rate,
could in general be expected on the points in controversy between Protestants
and Catholics or within any church. In the Examination, accordingly, he
repeatedly approaches issues in terms of what view would be safer to hold
or to follow (pp. Ilf.,45f., 119, 179). This applies even to such fundamental
doctrines as those of the Trinity and Incarnation and the Eucharist (Exam
21,127). And with regard to the proposal to admit Protestants to the Roman
communion without first settling all the controversial issues, Leibniz would
urge Catholics to consider that "the salvation [or well-being, salus] of the
Christian people is the supreme law of the church" (A I,x,167; cf. F 1,28).
We might be tempted to interpret Leibniz's theological pragmatism in an
antirealist sense, as an approach in which beliefs are not really adopted and
. held, but one merely decides to act, in prudence, as if one believed certain
things. I am sure this would be a mistaken interpretation. Remember that
Leibniz assigned all merely probable reasoning to the practical part of philosophy, so that if practical judgment yields no belief, he will allow us no
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beliefs about most topics of ordinary life. I see no adequate ground, in most
cases, to doubt Leibniz's sincerity in professing belief in Christian doctrines
that he regards as indemonstrable and resting on revelation. His consciously
pragmatic methodology does, however, help to make it intelligible that his
discussions of controversial topics in theology commonly manifest the political calculations of an aspiring architect of church unity much more than any
fervor of personal conviction.
(2) If most of revealed theology, both as merely probable and as concerned
with our moral relation to God, belongs for Leibniz to the realm of "practical
theology,"39 it is not suprising that he gives a certain priority to issues of
practice. From a Protestant point of view, as Leibniz conceives of it, it is not
the dogmas but the practices of the Roman Catholic Church that pose the
greatest obstacle to church reunion (A l,iv,357). He never saw a fundamental
opposition between Lutheran and Catholic dogmas, and therefore believed
that reunion was possible salvis principiis utriusque partis [preserving the
principles of both parties] (A l,iv,386). In this he is indeed in tune with the
Augsburg Confession, which, more than most expressions of Protestantism,
emphasized its agreements with Catholic doctrines and tried to direct controversial attention to alleged abuses in practice. 40 Likewise, except for the
doctrine of justification, all the nonnegotiable issues of Molanus's Method
were matters of practice.
A practical issue that receives striking emphasis from Leibniz is that of
divorce. In 1692 he declares to Count Ernst that "such a controversy about
practice is much more important than speculations about the manner of grace
or of justification" (A l,vii,260); and in the Examination (pp. 181-87) he is
more assertive about divorce than about most other issues, and insists on an
interpretation of the Council of Trent that is more permissive, and more
acceptable to Protestants, than he might once have found exegetically plausible,41 though probably still not fully acceptable from his own point of view.
The issue is one he had said might be enough of itself to keep a conscientious
Protestant from joining the Roman Church (A l,iv,329).
Leibniz understands the function of revealed theology not only as practical,
but very largely in terms of a political analogy. He conceives the special
relation that God has to intelligent creatures as that of a legislator and monarch ruling a republic of spirits, city of God, or kingdom of grace (DM 36-37,
Mon 84-90, Exam 11). The Examination (p. 11) introduces revelation as a
way in which God "as Legislator declares his particular and public [apertam]
will regarding the acts of minds and the governance of his City."
The church, viewed as a "Sacred City" and "interpreter of [God's] will
(Exam 171), has therefore a central place in Leibniz's conception of religion
and of the purpose of revelation. Not that the church depends entirely on
revelation. According to a text Leibniz wrote in the period 1678-82, the
largest "natural community" is
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the church of God, which even without revelation could indeed have existed
among humans and been maintained and propagated by pious [people] and
saints. Its aim is an eternal happiness. And it's no wonder I call it a Natural
society, inasmuch as a Natural religion and desire for immortality are also
implanted in us. This community of the saints is Catholic or universal and
binds the whole human race together. If revelation is added now, the previous
bond is not ruptured but strengthened. (vE 448 == Gr 603)

So conceived, the church ought in principle to coincide with the whole republic of spirits or kingdom of grace. This conception underlies Leibniz's
interreligious as well as interdenominational ecumenism.
If the church is to interpret God's will, where there is a revelation, it needs
a structure of authority. The highly articulated institutional and legal structure of the Roman Catholic Church appealed mightily to the lawyer in Leibniz. There can hardly be any doubt that when he wrote the Examination, he
thought that the Roman hierarchy had a powerful claim on the allegiance of
all Christians-or would have one if it could make its claim consistent with
the reasonable demands of their conscience. He declared that the Roman
Church is "the Catholic Church, Visible and recognizable by the continual
succession of its Hierarchy" (A I,iv,320). This hierarchy's historic claims to
legitimacy were pretty clearly the chief attraction that Roman Catholicism
held for Leibniz. 42 Nonetheless, the divine gift of infallibility that Leibniz
did accord the church extended only to the decisions of genuine ecumenical
councils, and to them only on the most central theological issues. 43 His statement about Papal authority in the Examination (p. 173) left ample room for
conscientious dissent, as we have already seen. It is clear that Leibniz personally approved of an extensive papal authority, but did not believe in papal
infallibility.44 His attitude to ecclesiastical authority is in fact quite pragmatic.
At one point he tells Count Ernst,
I am not entering into the discussion whether the jurisdiction of the Pope is
explicitly of divine right; it suffices that the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy in general doubtless is, and must be respected under the State or form in which it
is found. (A I,iv,355)

Most of the Examination is devoted to an exposition and defense of one way
of respecting ecclesiastical authority. If Leibniz himself did not think it in
all respects the best way, that was for him in principle a pragmatic judgment,
and primarily a judgment about the best means of promoting a love for God
above all things.
(3) He recognized, nonetheless, an authority to which all ecclesiastical
authority must yield: the authority of rational demonstration. The avoidance
of "opinions involving contradictions" is presented in 1679 as a compelling
norm for theological interpretation (A II,i,488/L 259). "What contravenes
these demonstrations [of geometry and metaphysics] would surely not be the
word of God," he wrote in 1677 (Gr 162); and he held the same in 1710 in

LEIBNIZ ON THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

541

the Theodicy (G VI,49-52/T 73-76). Likewise in the Examination he acknowledges that philosophical demonstration can force reinterpretation in revealed
theology. Specifically, if the Cartesian thesis that extension is the essence of
body "could be demonstrated by unconquered arguments of metaphysical
necessity," the doctrine of the real presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist
would have to be abandoned, and the relevant texts would have to be reinterpreted (Exam 127). The fact that for Leibniz alleged revelation must yield
to philosophical demonstration should be noted as perhaps the clearest proof
that, despite its pragmatic basis, Leibnizian revealed theology has the character of genuine belief, which can come into conflict with other beliefs.
To be sure there is a text, perhaps from the early 1680's, in which Leibniz
states that "when reason and revelation seem to conflict, it will be safer to
distrust reason than to accommodate revelation to reason by a distorted interpretation." As the text proceeds, however, it becomes clear that Leibniz
thinks this depends on how powerful the arguments of reason are, and how
distorting the interpretation is that must be imposed on revelation. When
there is an "unbreakable demonstration," it seems that something else must
yield. The final, cautious, pragmatic conclusion is only that "in doubt, when
great reasons do not prevent it, it is safer for a Christian to adhere to the strict
meaning of the divine words" (Gr 31f.).
It is quite understandable then that Leibniz would not give up the results
of the metaphysical demonstrations he thought he possessed, in order to
conform with doctrines to which he granted at best a pragmatic justification.
It is the more understandable when we add that some of these demonstrations
were in his opinion the surest and religiously most satisfactory foundation of
the love of God above all things, and capable of giving "here below the
foretaste of an eternal life" (Gr 7-10,162). The doctrines of natural or rational, metaphysically demonstrable theology, particularly that of the love of
God above all things, were for Leibniz the most important part of religion
(Gr 161f.).
Leibniz was not a Deist, and did not think Christianity was merely a republication of the religion of nature. He accepted, and treated with great
seriousness, doctrines that he regarded as peculiar to Christianity and no part
of natural theology. But he did think of the revealed part of theology and
religion as ordained primarily for the service of the religion of nature, in the
sense of having as their prime function the fostering of the natural religious
virtue of supreme love for God.
4. Conclusion
To those who have worked hardest on theological foundations for reunion of
the Christian churches in the twentieth century, Leibniz's interest in the distinctive features of both Protestant and Catholic viewpoints is bound to seem
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superficial, despite his prodigious theological learning. Indeed it is superficial, in ways that are doubtless connected with its pragmatic character. Perhaps we should also wonder whether a theology could both be ecumenical
and seem profound to us without recourse to some of the ways of thinking
about the relation of theology to history that were developed only in the
course of the nineteenth century.
Leibniz's interests lay elsewhere: in theology as a structural (he might have
said juridical) feature of religious institutions, in religious institutions as
necessary for the formation of religious devotion, and in finding both a just God
of all peoples and a common core of devotion in different religious traditions-if
possible, in all of them. It is possible that these interests may seem more exciting
in the twenty-first century than they have in much of the twentieth.
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Okumenizitiit des Luthe rtums (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1961), p. 133. This book
is the most useful work I have found on Calixt and his influence. But see also Johannes
Wallmann, Der Theologiebegriff bei Johann Gerhard und Georg Calixt (Tiibingen: J.C.B.
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